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We consider a collective choice process where three players make proposals sequentially on 
how to divide a given quantity of resources. Afterwards, one of the proposals is chosen by 
majority decision. If no proposal obtains a majority, a proposal is drawn by lot. We establish 
the existence of the set of subgame perfect equilibria, using a suitable refinement concept. In 
any equilibrium, the first agent offers the whole cake to the second proposal-maker, who in 
turn offers the whole cake back to the first agent. The third agent is then indifferent about 
dividing the cake between himself and the first or the second agent. 
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In this paper, we study the division of a cake by majority decision with lotteries to
break ties. Each of three players proposes a division of the cake. Afterwards, they
choose one of the proposals by majority voting. If no proposal receives a majority, one
of the proposals is chosen by lottery. The essential features of this model are that there
is a deﬁnite end of the collective choice process and that no resources are discarded in
case of disagreement.
There is a number of real-world examples in which proposals are made sequentially and
voting takes place after all the proposals have been made. For instance, in legislative
bargaining with simple open rules, agents are appointed sequentially for agenda-setting
and they can make proposals, knowing the proposals made so far. If an agent brings a
set of proposals to vote and one proposal passes, the process ends [see Krehbiel (1991)
for a survey of such legislative organizations]. Moreover, many collective decisions by
committees of public or private organizations are governed by open sequential proposals
followed by a majority vote. The lottery rule for tie-breaking is somewhat less common,
although there is a number of real-world substitutes more or less resembling a lottery.
In some legislatures, for instance, the chairman of a committee does not participate in
the voting itself, but he has a casting vote allowing him to break ties. If his preferences
are not known to the committee members, to them, his tie-breaking move may be
similar to a lottery. One can experience such decision schemes personally in committee
meetings on budget allocations at German universities.
We show here that there is an inﬁnite number of subgame perfect equilibria that all
yield the same two outcomes. In both outcomes, the ﬁrst player making a proposal
oﬀers the whole cake to the second proposal-maker, who in turn oﬀers the whole cake
back to the ﬁrst player. The diﬀerence between the two outcomes is as follows: The
third player oﬀers half of the cake to himself in both outcomes, while he oﬀers the
other half to the ﬁrst player in one outcome and to the second player in the other. The
proposal will be chosen by a majority in the voting stage. Hence, in both outcomes,
the cake will merely be divided among 2 players. Player 3 is always one of the two
players receiving half of the cake.
Player 3 is in a dominant position because given any two former proposals, he can
decide which proposal should get a majority by making an adequate proposal himself.
Since Player 2 is aware of this, he will always try to design his proposal in such a
1way that Player 3 will choose him as a partner, thus getting more than Player 1.
Ultimately, this is the reason why Player 1 tries to disadvantage Player 2 as much as
possible by oﬀering the whole cake to Player 2, because then, the only chance Player
2 has of countering this proposal is to oﬀer the whole cake to Player 1 as well. This
competition results in symmetric disadvantages for Players 1 and 2 and it allows Player
3 to choose a partner at random. Player 3 is indiﬀerent about whom to cooperate with
because he has to oﬀer both players the same utility, compensating one of them for a tie
and drawing him into a coalition. Therefore, any mixed strategy by Player 3, to oﬀer
half of the cake to Player 1 or 2, can be played in equilibrium with some probability.
2 Relation to the Literature
Majority rule and drawing lots are standard procedures for dividing resources in collec-
tive choice processes of the kind encountered in legislatures or committees [e.g. Baron
and Ferejohn (1989), Bernholz and Breyer (1994)]. Accordingly, we are interested in
the positive analysis of the division of resources we obtain in such cases. Our work is
related to two strands of literature. First, the division of resources has been studied
from the perspective of alternative collective choice processes. Mueller (1978) examined
the veto rule, under which the resources are thrown away in case in disagreement. In
such games, equilibria show a strong tendency towards equal shares for each individual.
Our analysis deals with majority decisions and takes the view that resources are not
thrown away in case of disagreement, but are subject to a tie-breaking procedure.
Second, Baron and Ferejohn (1989) have examined the division of resources by majority
rule. If no agreement is reached, players can make new proposals. The proposer receives
disproportionate beneﬁts and the number of recipients of positive shares of the cake is
at least a bare majority, but may also exceed this ﬁgure. In our case, there is a deﬁnite
end to the collective choice process, which forces players to choose between agreement
and tie-breaking procedure.
3 The Game
We consider a game involving three players denoted by i,j, and k = 1,2,3 who wish
to divide a cake in the following way:
First, at the proposal stage, the players sequentially make open proposals about the
2division of the cake.
1. Player 1 proposes a division of the cake to Players 2 and 3, not knowing their
proposals.
2. Player 2 makes a second proposal, knowing Player 1’s proposal.
3. Player 3 suggests a division, knowing the proposals of the two former players.
Then, at the voting stage, the group selects one of these proposals1 by majority voting.
An oﬀer receiving 2 or 3 votes will be implemented. If no majority can be reached, i.e.
if each proposal gets one vote,2 the winning proposal is selected by drawing lots and
each proposal is selected with a probability of 1
3. Hence, the cake is either divided by
majority decision or by lot.
Note that without loss of generality, the labeling of the players and hence the sequence
of proposals by the players is given exogenously.3
A proposal by Player i is denoted by Di = (ai1,ai2,ai3). Accordingly, ai1, ai2, and ai3
denote the shares of the cake oﬀered by Player i to Players 1, 2, and 3 respectively.
The resource constraint implies that
P3
j=1 aij = 1, ∀i. Thus, after every player has














Every player is risk-neutral and individual j derives utility4
U : [0,1] → [0,1] ,U(aij) = aij (2)
1If two proposals coincide, they are treated as one proposal.
2The omission of abstentions will be explained in the characterization of equilibria.
3We might add a pre-stage at which the label of an agent is selected at random. Such an additional
stage would equalize expected utilities across players in case of identical utility functions. Since we
are focusing on actual resource divisions, we skip the pre-stage.
4Since all players are identical, we drop the index for the utility function.
3if the proposal Di is selected by majority voting. The expected utility uj for Player j






aij ,j = 1,2,3 (3)
In many parts of the analysis, we need the relative quality of the oﬀers made to the
speciﬁc players. Therefore, we introduce the rank matrix R. In this matrix, the best
oﬀer (the biggest share of the cake) aij for Player j is labeled 3, the second best 2, and

































Additionally, we denote the biggest share aij of the cake oﬀered to Player j by Xj, the
second biggest by Yj, and the worst by Zj.
If we label the entries of R as rij (i,j = 1,2,3), where rij is the rank of Player i’s
proposal made to Player j, then the conversion function Φ[A] = R is technically given
by
Φ : rij =
3 X
k=1
Θ(aij − akj) (6)
where Θ(p − q) (p,q ∈ IR) is the Heavyside function given by
Θ(p − q) =
½
1 p − q ≥ 0
0 otherwise (7)
4 Voting Equilibria and Proposal-Making
In this section, we ﬁrst derive the voting equilibria based on a given set of proposals.
The voting strategy of Player i is to select one proposal.5 We note that the concept
5Allowing abstention does not change the voting equilibria. Abstention is weakly dominated by
voting for the best proposal for Player i.
4of a Nash equilibrium is insuﬃcient for voting games with non-unanimity voting rules,
as it can involve weakly dominated strategies. For that purpose, we use the following
reﬁnements and tie-breaking rules (for cases of indiﬀerence between payoﬀs). These
hold throughout the paper.
4.1 Reﬁnements
Reﬁnement 1
A Nash equilibrium of the voting game has to be trembling hand perfect.6
Trembling hand perfection has two immediate consequences:
Lemma 1
Suppose that reﬁnement 1 holds. Then
(i) A player never votes for the least favorable proposal made to him, i.e. a proposal
labeled 1 in the rank matrix.
(ii) In any Nash equilibrium where agents i and j (i 6= j) vote for the same proposal,
agent k (k 6= i, j) votes for his best proposal.
The elimination of weakly dominated strategies is standard. The second property also
follows directly from the deﬁnition of trembling hand perfection, as any error by Players
i or j leads either to a tie-break or to a majority win for the best proposal of voter i.
The next reﬁnement eliminates voting equilibria that are payoﬀ-dominated.
Reﬁnement 2
If only one proposal includes 2 maxima, then it is the unique equilibrium.
This property follows from payoﬀ dominance (see Fudenberg and Tirole 1992). A
proposal with 2 maxima for, say, individuals i and j, is a Nash equilibrium supported
by the votes of i and j. Any other possible Nash equilibrium is worse for i and j and
hence payoﬀ-dominated for the coalition {i,j}.
Even if both reﬁnements are applied, we will still have multiple equilibria. For that pur-
pose, we use the notion of correlated equilibria with public randomization introduced
by Aumann (1974) (see e.g. Myerson 1991 for discussion). This concept assumes that
voters engage in pre-play communication and use a coordination device to settle for
6See Selten (1975) for the original formalization and Fudenberg and Tirole (1992) for a survey.
5a particular equilibrium. Such a device is a publicly observable random variable that
agents use to determine which equilibrium should be played. For instance, agents may
ﬂip a coin, or a mediator may announce the outcome of the randomization process.
















In this case, D1 and D2 are equilibria and Player 1 and Player 3 prefer their second-best
oﬀer to a tie-break. Furthermore, these proposals contain the ﬁrst- and second-best
oﬀer by Player 1 and Player 3. Therefore, we assume that Player 1 and Player 3 are
playing a correlated strategy. With probability p1 = 1
2, both play D1, and with p2 = 1
2
they play D2.
Accordingly, we use the concept of correlated equilibria as follows:
Reﬁnement 3
A correlated equilibrium arises if two proposals Di, Dj (i 6= j, i,j = 1,2,3) are
equilibria7 and they contain the best and second-best oﬀer by the same two players. In
the correlated equilibrium, both players under consideration will vote with probability
1
2 for Di or Dj. The expected payoﬀs for all players are then given by Cij = 1
2(Di+Dj).

















Here, D2 and D3 are equilibria, but Player 2, who is needed for the majority of D3,
has no incentive to establish a coordination for D2 and D3 because D3 contains his
second-best and D2 his worst oﬀer. These cases are discussed in subsection 4.3 and
ruled out by Reﬁnement 4.
4.2 Tie-breaking Rules
In this subsection, we introduce some tie-breaking rules to simplify the exposition.
Since agents try to receive a share as big as possible, there is only one possible motive
7We can neglect correlated equilibria with public randomization over all three proposals, as they
are equivalent to selecting proposals by lot.
6for an agent to deviate from voting for the best proposal and to vote for the second-
best oﬀer instead: If he cannot establish a majority of votes for his best proposal, the
player will prefer his second-best oﬀer to a tie-break. To illustrate this case, consider
















Because of Reﬁnement 1, Player 2 votes for D2 and Player 3 for D3. D1, favored
by Player 1, thus has no chance of becoming selected, but Y1 = 1




2 + 0) = 2
5, his expected share in the case of drawing lots. Therefore,
Player 1 votes for D2 together with Player 2 to avoid a tie-break decision. The case
where the payoﬀs of the second-best oﬀer and of drawing lots coincide is resolved in
the following tie-breaking rule:
Tie-Break Rule 1
If Yj = uj, all players will prefer their second-best bid to drawing lots.
Note that “prefer” in tie-breaking rule 1 means that Player i will avoid drawing lots if he
is indiﬀerent between his second-best proposal and drawing lots. The tie-breaking rule
means that Player i will vote for his best proposal if it receives a majority. Otherwise,
he will vote for the second-best proposal. The tie-breaking rule immediately implies
Lemma 2
Suppose that there exists at least one voting equilibrium where a majority is formed.
Then drawing lots will not occur as an equilibrium.
To formulate the next tie-breaking rule, we denote an equilibrium as a single-proposal
equilibrium if that single proposal is selected without the use of random selection
devices. A single-proposal equilibrium necessarily requires that pure voting strategies
are played and that a majority supports one proposal.
Tie-Break Rule 2
If the payoﬀs coincide, a player will prefer a single-proposal equilibrium to a correlated
equilibrium and a correlated equilibrium to drawing lots.
4.3 Proposal-Making
Having characterized the structure of the voting equilibria, we turn now to proposal-
making. In formulating the proposal-making stage, we face two problems.
7First, multiple voting equilibria may still exist (see e.g. the proposal matrix in equa-
tion 9). Second, players may be indiﬀerent between several proposals (e.g. Player
3 is always indiﬀerent between at least two proposals if D1 = (a11,1 − a11,0) and
D2 = (1 − a11,a11,0)).
Addressing the ﬁrst point, we now introduce another reﬁnement.
Reﬁnement 4
Given the proposals D1 and D2, Player 3 makes his proposal in such a way that the pro-
posal matrix A exhibits either a single-proposal equilibrium, a correlated equilibrium,
or an equilibrium with drawing lots.
This reﬁnement ensures that payoﬀs are well-deﬁned at the voting stage. This can be
justiﬁed by the aversion against strategic uncertainty. A priori, it is unclear whether
Player 3 can always choose among the three options in the reﬁnement. In the proof of
the overall equilibrium, we will show that this is always possible for Player 3.
The second point is handled by an additional tie-breaking rule.
Tie-Break Rule 3
If Player i is indiﬀerent between making several proposals, every proposal is submitted
with the same probability.
4.4 The Structure of Voting Equilibria
After these preparations, we can now provide an overview of the structure of voting
equilibria. We start by calculating equilibria in two examples. For this purpose, we
extend the conversion of proposal matrix A to rank matrix R, since it is often necessary
to distinguish whether it is possible for a player to deviate to his second-best proposal
or not. This is done by introducing rank 2∗ if any Yj ≥ uj (j = 1,2,3). If we consider
















To calculate the equilibria, we ask whether Player i deviates, given the votes of Players
j and k (i 6= j 6= k and the players are labeled P1, P2 and P3). If Player i does deviate,
his payoﬀ is underlined.
8P1 −→ D1 P1 −→ D2 P1 −→ D3
P2






































































































=⇒ D2 is chosen (12)
We see that these calculations can be done simply by regarding the extended rank

















and end up with
P1 −→ D1 P1 −→ D2 P1 −→ D3
P2













































































































=⇒ D2 is chosen (14)
Since players 1 and 3 form the majority in both voting schemes, these equilibria are
correlated.
In the following, we discuss the possibility of extending rank matrices and their equi-
libria. We denote a single-proposal equilibrium as D∗
i, an equilibrium with drawing
lots as T ∗ and a correlated equilibrium as C∗
ij (i 6= j). In the discussion, the matrices
9described are representatives of a whole class of matrices that can be derived from the























Where convenient, we omit cases with Xi 6= Yi = Zi, because they are qualitatively
equal to cases with Xi 6= Yi 6= Zi ∧ Yi < ui, and we use rij = 2(∗) if the conversion of
aij in 2 or 2∗ does not change the equilibrium outcome.























3. D1 6= D2 6= D3












































































(e) X1 6= Y1 6= Z1 ∧ X2 6= Y2 6= Z2 ∧ X3 6= Y3 6= Z3
i. Doublemax:=
¡

















A −→ L∗ (22)
































































115 Division of the Cake
In this section, we derive the overall equilibrium of the game. For that purpose, we
have to compare the expected payoﬀs for the diﬀerent players. Accordingly, we denote
the expected payoﬀ of Player i by πi (i = 1,2,3).
5.1 Overall Equilibrium
The solution of the game is given by the following theorem.8
Theorem 1













where D3 = (1
2,0, 1
2) is a single-proposal equilibrium supported by Players 1 and 3, and
D3 = (0, 1
2, 1
2) is a single-proposal equilibrium supported by Players 2 and 3. As Player
3 is indiﬀerent between D3 = (1
2,0, 1
2) and D3 = (0, 1
2, 1
2), he will make either proposal
with a probability of 1










The proof of the theorem follows directly from Corollary 1 and Propositions 5 and 6
in subsections 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5.
This theorem can be motivated as follows: If Player 1 makes any proposal D1 6= (0,1,0),
Player 2 will counter it with a proposal D2 such that π1 is less than 1
4. But by proposing
D1 = (0,1,0), Player 1 makes Player 2 so unattractive that any counter-proposal
D2 6= (1,0,0) will give Player 2 a payoﬀ π2 of less than 1
4. This implies that ultimately,
the cake is divided half-by-half between Players 1 and 3 or Players 2 and 3.
5.2 Strategy of the Proof
We prove Theorem 1 by backward induction. This is illustrated in the following steps:
Step 1: We determine the best response of Player 3 given any D1 and D2 and cal-
culate the minimum payoﬀ π3, given speciﬁc relations between D1 and D2.
8The solution has been conjectured in Gersbach and Wehrspohn (2001).
12Step 2: Given D1 6= (0,1,0), we determine a proposal D2 giving Player 2 a payoﬀ of
π2 such that, together with the minimum payoﬀ of π3 of Player 3 from step
1, the resource constraint implies π1 < 1
4 for Player 1.
Step 3: Given D1 = (0,1,0), we calculate the payoﬀ π2 if Player 2 makes any pro-
posal D2 6= (1,0,0) and compare this with his payoﬀ π2 when proposing
D2 = (1,0,0).
5.3 Strategy of Player 3
Given D1, D2, Player 3’s ambition is to maximize his share of the cake by making an
appropriate proposal D3.
Given D1 and D2, Player 3 will generally consider four possible equilibrium outcomes
when designing his proposal D3.
I: D3 is a single-proposal equilibrium.
II: D1 or D2 is a single-proposal equilibrium.
III: A correlated equilibrium arises.
IV: The cake is divided by drawing lots.
We now give examples of cases where the diﬀerent designing principles (I-IV) are the
best reactions of Player 3. The detailed rationalization of the best reaction of Player























=⇒ D3 = (0.0,0.7 + ²,0.3 − ²) =⇒ L∗
with ² > 0 and inﬁnitesimally small.
9In this case, we have a continuum of best proposals D3 = (a31,a32,1−a31−a32) with a31 ∈ (0.9,1]
and a32 ∈ [0,1 − a31].
13The kind of equilibrium outcome (I–IV) Player 3 prefers depends strongly on the
relations between the proposals D1 and D2, characterized by the submatrix a of the














and the corresponding rank matrix ρ, which is calculated from a in a similar way as R
from A:





where φ is deﬁned in a similar way to Φ (see (6)) as
φ : ρij =
2 X
k=1
Θ(aij − akj) (28)
The relevance of a and ρ will be shown in the proofs of the following propositions and
corollaries.
Proposition 1
Given D1 and D2 and that ρ is symmetric =⇒ determining the best reaction of Player
3 implies π3 ≥ 3
8.
Corollary 1





2), which implies π1 = π2 = 1
4 and π3 = 1
2.
Proposition 2
















and that ρ is non-symmetric =⇒ determining























or D3 = (1
4, 1
2 + ², 1
4 − ²), which implies π1 = π2 = 7
16 + ²
4 and π3 = 1
8 − ²
2.
(The proofs are given in the appendix).
145.4 Strategy of Player 2
In this section, we analyze possible reactions by Player 2, given D1 and the reaction of
Player 3 derived in section 5.3.
For that purpose, we divide the proposal set of D1 given by
































∀ D1 ∈ A ∪ B ∃ a proposal10 Ds
2 of Player 2, such that ρ is symmetric and π2 > 3
8.
Corollary 3
If for D1 ∈ A ∪ B ∃ a proposal11 Dns
2 of Player 2, such that ρ is non-symmetric and
π2(Dns
2 ) ≥ π2(Ds
2) =⇒ π2(Dns
2 ) ≥ 1
2 or π1(Dns
2 ) < 1
4.
Proposition 4
∀ D1 ∈ C ∃ a proposal Dns
2 of Player 2, such that ρ is non-symmetric and π2 ≥ 1
2 or
the best proposal Dns
2 with ρ non-symmetric for Player 2 implies π1 = 0.
Corollary 4
If for D1 ∈ C ∃ a proposal Ds
2 of Player 2, such that ρ is symmetric and π2(Ds
2) ≥
π2(Dns




Given D1 = (0,1,0), the best reaction of Player 2 is D2 = (1,0,0).
(The proofs are given in the appendix).
10Ds
2 is a proposal made by Player 2 such that a is symmetric.
11Dns
2 is a proposal made by Player 2 such that a is non-symmetric.
155.5 Strategy of Player 1
Since Player 1 anticipates the reactions of Players 2 and 3, we obtain the following
proposition:
Proposition 6
The best proposal of Player 1 is D1 = (0,1,0).
Proof of Proposition 6
(i) Suppose D1 6= (0,1,0) and D2 with ρ symmetric is the best reaction of Player 2
=⇒ π3 ≥ 3
8 (Proposition 1) and π2 > 3
8 (Proposition 3 and Corollary 3)




8 π3= 1 =⇒ π1 < 1
4.
(ii) Suppose D1 6= (0,1,0) and D2 with ρ non-symmetric is the best reaction of
Player 2
=⇒ π3 > 1
4 Proposition12 2) and π2 ≥ 1
2 ∨ π1 < 1
4 (Corollary 3 and Proposition 4)




4 π3= 1 =⇒ π1 < 1
4,
or we have directly π1 < 1
4.
=⇒ (i) and (ii), together with Corollary 1 and Proposition 5, imply that D1 = (0,1,0)
is the best proposal for Player 1.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
We have examined a common collective choice process to study the allocation of re-
sources among a group of people. The analysis reveals that the ﬁrst two agents want to
make each other as unattractive as possible with regard to the third agent’s proposal.
To do so, they oﬀer each other the whole cake, and the third player can ensure that he
obtains one half of the cake.
This outcome exhibits a powerful last-mover advantage, whereas the other players
are forced to make strategic proposals involving zero resources for themselves. They
expect 1
4 of the cake. Additionally, it seems surprising that the ﬁrst player can totally
12Note that neither D2 = (1
2, 1
2,0) is the best reaction of Player 2 given that D1 = (0,0,1), nor is
D2 = (0,0,1) the best reaction of Player 2 given that D1 = (1
2, 1
2,0).
16outweigh the second-mover advantage of the second player. The way in which these
characteristics extend to group decisions with a larger number of individuals is an
important avenue to future research. Of course, there is a variety of game-theoretic
considerations and alternative reﬁnement concepts that can be examined. How robust
our main ﬁndings are with regard to such extensions remains to be explored. A further
useful extension of our framework would be to consider the role of risk preferences. A
large literature has generated the ﬁnding that it is disadvantageous to be relatively risk
averse in bargaining settings.13 Harrington (1989 and 1990) has, however, shown that
in bargaining games in which acceptance of a proposed allocation only requires the
approval of a majority, it is advantageous for a player to be relatively risk averse. How
risk aversion in our model aﬀects the utility of each member would be be an interesting
research project.
13At least since Zeuthen (1930), risk preferences have been thought to be an important determinant
of the outcome of bargaining. The role of risk preferences in a bargaining setting has been examined
using both an axiomatic framework [see Roth (1979), Kihlstrom, Roth and Schmeidler (1981), Nielsen
(1984)] and a non-cooperative game framework [Roth (1985), Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinksy
(1986) and Harrington (1986)]. These studies have conﬁrmed that the more risk averse an agent is,
the lower his share. Notable exceptions to this ﬁnding are described by Roth and Rothblum (1982)
and Osborne (1985).
177 Appendix
We have already mentioned that the speciﬁc relations between D1 and D2 are relevant
for the construction of the best reaction D3 given by ρ and a. Now we need a more
detailed speciﬁcation of the relations between the entries of a. Therefore we deﬁne
µj = 1
2(a1j + a2j)
µ = max{µ1 ,µ2}
µ = min{µ1 ,µ2}
xj = max{a1j ,a2j}
yj = min{a1j ,a2j}
x = min{x1 ,x2}
7.1 Proof of Propositions 1 and 2 and Corollaries 1 and 2
Before we start, note that the best reaction D3 is not always unique (i.e. x1 = x2∧y1 =
y2, or see footnote 9). But as we only want to determine the minimum share of the
cake for Player 3, it is suﬃcient to give only one best reaction.
7.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1

















For ρ2 we have D1 = D2, and the best proposal D3 is given by
1. If D1 = (0,0,1) ⇒ D3 = (0,0,1)
2. If D1 6= (0,0,1) ⇒ D3 = (x+²,0,1−x−²) if x1 = x and D3 = (0,x+²,1−x−²)
if x2 = x.
For ρ1 or ρ10 it is suﬃcient to analyze ρ1 only, as the same arguments follow for ρ10 by
exchanging the columns in matrix a.









a13 = 1 − x1 − y2
a23 = 1 − x2 − y1
a33 = 1 − a31 − a32
(32)
18To calculate the best reaction of Player 3, the following properties of A are relevant:
(i) xi > a3i ≥ µi =⇒ Φ(xi) = 3,Φ(yi) = 1,Φ(a3i) = 2∗
(ii) xi > yi > a3i > 2yi − xi =⇒ Φ(xi) = 3,Φ(yi) = 2,Φ(a3i) = 1
(iii) xi > yi > a3i and a3i ≤ 2yi − xi=⇒ Φ(xi) = 3,Φ(yi) = 2∗,Φ(a3i) = 1
(iv) xi = a3i > yi =⇒ Φ(xi) = 3,Φ(yi) = 1,Φ(a3i) = 3















3: Player 3 oﬀers Player 1 or 2 µ and keeps the rest for himself, such that D3 is a















D1 = (0.7 0.1 0.2)
D2 = (0.1 0.8 0.1)
D
µ




3: Player 3 oﬀers Player 1 or 2 µ and keeps the rest for himself, such that D3 is a















D1 = (0.6 0.4 0.0)
D2 = (0.2 0.6 0.2)
D
µ




3 : Player 3 oﬀers Player i a3i = µi, Player j a3j = 2yj − xj + ² and keeps the
rest for himself, such that D3 is a unique equilibrium and he receives a payoﬀ















D1 = (0.58 0.38 0.04 )
D2 = (0.32 0.68 0.00 )
D
µ1
3 = (0.45 0.08 + ² 0.47 − ² )
D
x
3: Player 3 oﬀers Player 1 or 2 x and keeps the rest for himself, such that D3 is a















D1 = (0.52 0.40 0.08)
D2 = (0.30 0.54 0.16)
D
x
3 = (0.52 0.00 0.48)
(36)
19DCor
3 : Player 3 oﬀers Player i a3i = µi, Player j a3j = 0
and keeps the rest for himself, such that D3 is part of the correlated equilibrium
and he receives a payoﬀ π3 = 1















D1 = (0.57 0.07 0.46)
D2 = (0.37 0.66 0.00)
Dcor
3 = (0.47 0.00 0.53)
(37)
DT
3 : (a) Player 3 proposes D3 = (0,0,1) if 2yi < xi (i = 1,2), such that the proposal

















D1 = (0.61 0.09 0.30)
D2 = (0.29 0.71 0.00)
DT
3 = (0.00 0.00 1.00)
(38)
(b) Player 3 oﬀers Player i a3i = 2yi − xi + ² if 2yi ≥ xi and Player j a3j = 0
if 2yj < xj (i 6= j) and keeps the rest for himself, such that the proposal is

















D1 = (0.58 0.30 0.12 )
D2 = (0.05 0.55 0.40 )
DT
3 = (0.00 0.05 + ² 0.95 − ² )
Note that constructing D3 in such a way that D1 or D2 are unique equilibria or D1 and
D2 form a correlated equilibrium can never be better than D
x
3, since 1 − x ≥ ai3 (i =
1,2) and oﬀering D
x
3 is always possible for Player 3 if ρ symmetric. This ensures that























feasible set in which it is the best reaction of Player 3. Also, we minimize the payoﬀ π3
giving the best reaction and the feasible set. In the course of these calculations we will
often draw upon the argument of contradiction. Accordingly, we introduce the sign
¢ ¢ ¡ ¡ ¢ ¢ ® to indicate a conclusion that contradicts the assumptions. Since every feasible set
is bounded by linear inequalities we can calculate min{π3} given the best reaction of
Player 3 by a simplex algorithm.14
14This minimization is done by Maple. Since the constraints are linear, there exists a ﬁnite algorithm
for calculating the extrema. These are located in the corners of the 4-dimensional hyper-polyeder.











3 being the best proposal for Player 3 (w.l.o.g µ1 = µ):
1. µ1 ≤ µ2
2. 2y2 < x2
3. ai3 ≤ aj3
4. 1 − µ1 + ai3 > 2aj3
o
i,j = 1,2 i 6= j







a13 z }| {
1 − x1 − y2 +
a23 z }| {






≤ 1 − 2
3(x1 + y1) < 1 − 1




• Correlated equilibrium versus D
µ
3:
1 − µ > 1
2(1 − µ + ai3), i = 1,2.




































3 being the best proposal for Player 3 (w.l.o.g µ2 = µ):
1. 2y2 ≥ x2
2. 2y1 < x1
3. µ2 ≤ x
4. ai3 ≤ aj3
5. 1 − µ2 + ai3 > 2aj3
o
i,j = 1,2 i 6= j
6. µ1 + 2y2 − x2 ≥ µ2







a13 z }| {
1 − x1 − y2 +
a23 z }| {
1 − x2 − y1 +
amax
33 z }| {
1 − (2y2 − x2)
¢
= 1 − 1


























• Correlated equilibrium versus D
µ
3:



















> 2 − x2 | {z }
>0
¢ ¢ ¡ ¡ ¢ ¢ ®
(44)






































3 being the best proposal for Player 3 (w.l.o.g. we consider




1. 2y2 ≥ x2
2. 2y1 < x1
3. µ1 + 2y2 − x2 < x
4. µ1 + 2y2 − x2 < µ2
5. ai3 ≤ aj3
6. 1 − (µ1 + 2y2 − x2 + ²) + ai3 > 2aj3
o
i,j = 1,2 i 6= j
• Drawing lots versus D
µ1
3 :
(a) µ2 < x see argumentation for D
µ
3.
(b) µ2 ≥ x =⇒ x = x1 and with µ1 + 2y2 − x2 < x1 =⇒
x1 + y1 < 2x1 + 2x2 − 4y2 < 4(x2 − y2) < 6(x2 − y2) =⇒
umax
3 = 1 − 1
3(x1 + y1) − y2 < 1 − µ1 − (2y2 − x2) = a33(D
µ1
3 )
22• Correlated equilibrium versus D
µi
3
For constraint set (i) we have µ2 > µ1 + 2y2 − x2




































1. 2y1 ≥ x1
2. 2y2 ≥ x2
3. µ1 + 2y2 − x2 < x
4. µ1 + 2y2 − x2 ≤ µ2 + 2y1 − x1







a13 z }| {
1 − x1 − y2 +
a23 z }| {
1 − x2 − y1 +
amax
33 z }| {
1 − 2y1 + x1 − ² − 2y2 + x2 − ²
0¢















< 1 − x
µ1+2y2−x2<x





(² ≤ x − (µ1 + 2y2 − x2)
(48)
• Correlated equilibrium versus D
µi
3
µ2 + 2y1 − x1 ≥ µ1 + 2y2 − x2







































3 being the best proposal for Player 3:
(i)
1. 2y2 ≥ x2
2. 2y1 < x1
3. µ2 ≥ x
4. µ1 + 2y2 − x2 > x



















• Correlated equilibrium versus D
x
3:
For a correlated equilibrium we need µ1 = µ. Otherwise it could not be
better than D
x
3, since 1−µ1 is part of the correlated payoﬀ of Player 3 and
1 − µ1 ≤ 1 − x.
Additionally we need the following rank matrix:
0
@
x1 y2 1 − x1 − y2
y1 x2 1 − y1 − x2










This implies the following three conditions for the existence of a correlated
equilibrium:
(a) µ1 < µ2
(b) a23 < a13
(c) 1 − µ1 + a23 < 2a13
Two cases are possible x1 = x ∨ x2 = x
(a) Suppose x1 = x =⇒
1 − µ1 + a23 < 2a13 ⇐⇒ 3x1 + 4y2 < 3y1 + 2x2 and
2y1 < x1 ⇐⇒ 3x1 + 4y2 > 6y1 + 4y2
2y2≥x2
≥ 6y1 + 2x2 ≥ 3y1 + 2x2 ¢ ¢ ¡ ¡ ¢ ¢ ®
(51)
24(b) Suppose x2 = x =⇒ ρ is no longer symmetric.

































1. 2y2 ≥ x2
2. 2y1 < x1
3. µ2 ≤ x
4. µ1 + 2y2 − x2 ≥ µ2
5.15 a13 ≤ a23
6. 1 − µ2 + a13 ≤ 2a23
7. 1
2(1 − µ2 + a23) ≤ 1 − x
• Drawing lots versus D
x
3:
If (x1 = x) constraint (4.) fails and if (x2 = x) the additionally required
constraint 1
3(1 − (2y2 − x2) + a13 + a23) > 1 − x fails.








































15Note that a13 > a23 is not possible. Suppose a13 > a23 =⇒ condition (6.) converts to 1−µ2+a23 ≤
2a13 =⇒ 4x1 − 2y1 + 3y2 ≤ 3x2
µ2≤µ1+2y2−x2
≤ x1 + y1 + 3y2 =⇒ 3x1 ≤ 2y1 ¢ ¢ ¡ ¡ ¢ ¢ ®
25(iii)
1. 2y2 ≥ x2
2. 2y1 < x1
3. µ1 + 2y2 − x2 ≤ x
4. µ1 + 2y2 − x2 ≤ µ2
5.16 a13 ≤ a23
6. 1 − (µ1 + 2y2 − x2) + a13 ≤ 2a23
7. 1
2(1 − µ2 + a23) ≤ 1 − x
8. 1 − (2y2 − x2) + a13 > 2a23
9. 1
3(1 − (2y2 − x2) + a13 + a23) ≤ 1 − x
• Drawing lots versus D
x
3:
The same argumentation holds as for constraint set (i) of D
µi
3 .
• Correlated equilibrium versus D
x
3:
The same argumentation holds as for constraint sets (i) and (ii) of D
x
3





































1. 2y2 ≥ x2
2. 2y1 ≥ x1
3. µ1 + 2y2 − x2 ≥ x
4. µ2 + 2y1 − x1 ≥ x




3 ≤ 1 − x follows directly from constraints (3.) and (4.).




3 (Correlated equilibrium) ≤ 1 − x follows directly from constraints (3.)
and (4.).
16Note that a23 < a13 is not possible. Suppose a23 < a13 =⇒ condition 6. converts to 1 − (µ1 +
2y2 − x2) + a23 ≤ 2a13 =⇒ x1 < y1 ¢ ¢ ¡ ¡ ¢ ¢ ® .


































5. Constraints on DCor
3 being the best proposal for Player 3:
(i)
1. 2y2 ≥ x2
2. 2y1 < x1
3. µ2 ≤ x
4. µ1 + 2y2 − x2 ≥ µ2
5.17 a13 ≤ a23
6. 1 − µ2 + a13 ≤ 2a23
7. 1
2(1 − µ2 + a23) < 1 − x
8. 1 − (2y2 − x2) + a13 > 2a23
9. 1
3(1 − (2y2 − x2) + a13 + a23) ≤ 1
2(1 − µ2 + a23)
• Drawing lots versus Dcor
3 : See constraint (9.).




































1. 2y2 ≥ x2
2. 2y1 < x1
3. µ1 + 2y2 − x2 < x
4. µ1 + 2y2 − x2 < µ2
5.18 a13 ≤ a23
6. 1 − (µ1 + 2y2 − x2) + a13 ≤ 2a23
7. 1
2(1 − µ2 + a23) > 1 − x
8. 1 − (2y2 − x2) + a13 > 2a23
9. 1
3(1 − (2y2 − x2) + a13 + a23) ≤ 1
2(1 − µ2 + a23)
• Drawing lots versus Dcor
3 : See constraint (9.).





































3 being the best proposal for Player 3:
1. 2y2 ≥ x2
2. 2y1 < x1
3. µ1 + 2y2 − x2 ≤ x
4. µ1 + 2y2 − x2 ≤ µ2
5.19 a13 ≤ a23
6. 1 − (µ1 + 2y2 − x2) + a13 ≤ 2a23
7. 1
2(1 − µ2 + a23) < 1
3(1 − (2y2 − x2) + a13 + a23)
8. 1 − (2y2 − x2) + a13 > 2a23
9. 1
3(1 − (2y2 − x2) + a13 + a23) > 1 − x
• Drawing lots versus Dcor
3 : See constraint (9.).
18See footnote 16.
19See footnote 16.















0.00 0.08 + ² 0.92 − ²
1















A (² > 3²0)
Since the minimum payoﬀ of D
x




8 and the constraints for
Dcor
3 and DL
3 directly imply that π3(Dcor
3 ) > 1 − x and π3(DL
3) > 1 − x, we obtain
πmin
3 (Dcor






























the constraints on D
µ
3 hold when µ1 = µ2 = µ = 1
2, which implies
that D3 = (1
2,0, 1
2) or D3 = (0, 1
2, 1
2) are the best reactions for Player 3 resulting in the
payoﬀs π1 = π2 = 1
4 and π3 = 1
2











3) for Player 3, we also obtain the following corollary, which will be used later:
Corollary 5
Given symmetric ρ =⇒ π2 > x iﬀ Dcor
3 or DL
3 is the best reaction for Player 3.
7.1.3 Proof of Proposition 2





































29In the following we only discuss ρns
1 , as the other cases arise by interchanging rows and
observing that for ρns
3
... nothing changes qualitatively. For ρns









a13 = 1 − y1 − y2
a23 = 1 − x1 − x2
a33 = 1 − a31 − a32
; (61)
First we observe that Player 3 has to oﬀer at least Player i more than xi to gain more
than π3 = 1 − x1 − x2, because otherwise D2 contains two maximum shares and is a
single-proposal equilibrium.20
As in the proof of Proposition 1, we look for the best oﬀer D3 and see that the following
properties of a are relevant:
• 1 ≥ a3i > 2xi − yi =⇒ Φ(xi) = 2,Φ(yi) = 1,Φ(a3i) = 3
• yi > a3i > 2yi − xi =⇒ Φ(xi) = 3,Φ(yi) = 2,Φ(a3i) = 1











Player 3 oﬀers Player 1 or 2 x+² and keeps the rest for himself, such that D3 is















D1 = (0.2 0.4 0.4 )
D2 = (0.4 0.6 0.0 )
D
x²
3 = (0.4 + ² 0.0 0.6 − ² )
2. Do
3
Player 3 oﬀers Player i a3i = 2xi−yi+² and keeps the rest for himself, such that















D1 = (0.1 0.25 0.65 )
D2 = (0.5 0.40 0.10 )
Do
3 = (0.9 + ² 0.00 0.1 − ² )
20If Player 3 only oﬀers Player 1 x1, D2 is still the only proposal with two maxima, or D2 and D3
are both voting equilibria but are not correlated.
303. D3
3
Player 3 oﬀers Player i 2xi − yi + ² (i ∈ {1,2}) and keeps the rest for himself,
such that D3 is a single-proposal equilibrium and he receives a payoﬀ π3 = 1 −















D1 = (0.1 0.25 0.65 )
D2 = (0.3 0.60 0.10 )
D3
3 = (0.5 + ² 0.00 0.5 − ² )
4. DT²
3
Player 3 oﬀers Player i a3i = 2xi−yi+² and keeps the rest for himself, such that
the proposal is chosen by drawing lots and he receives a payoﬀ π3 = 1
3(1−(2x1−















D1 = (0.1 0.1 0.8 )
D2 = (0.4 0.6 0.0 )
DT²






3 being the best proposal for Player 3:
1. y1 + y2 > x
Since Player 3 needs to oﬀer at least Player i a3i = x + ² to prevent D2 from
being a single-proposal equilibrium and 1 − x + ² > ai3 i = 1,2, D
x²
3 is better
than all other proposals.

































3 being the best proposal for Player 3:
1. y1 + y2 ≤ x
2. 2yi ≥ xi
3. 2xj − yj < 1
o
i,j = 1,2 i 6= j
Note that r23 = 2∗ is not possible, as we have




+1 − (y1 + y2)
| {z }
a13




3) = 1−(2x1−y1+²) > a23, Player 3 can rise aj3 so that 1−a3j = a23.
Since π3 = 1−y1 −y2 is only ² worse than the payoﬀ of D
x²
3 , Do
3 is the best oﬀer.











0.9 + ² 0.0 0.1 − ²
1
A




















3 being the best proposal for Player 3:
(i)
1. y1 + y2 ≤ x
2. 2y1 < x1
3. 2y2 < x2
4. 2xi − yi < 1
5. 1 − (2xi − yi + ²) ≥ 1
2(a13 + a23)21
o
(i = 1 ∨ i = 2)
• Drawing lots versus D3
3:
With drawing lots, Player 3 cannot gain more than π3 = 1
2(a13 +a23)−²0 ≤
π3(D3
3(i)) because of constraint (5.).
21If 2xi − yi < 1 and 1 − (2xi − yi + ²) ≥ 1
2(a13 + a23) holds simultaneously for i = 1,2, Player 3
chooses mini=1,2{2xi − yi}.











0.5 + ² 0.0 0.5 − ²
1
A
















1. y1 + y2 ≤ x
2. 2yi < xi
3. 2yj ≥ xj
4. 2xj − yj < 1
5. 2xi − yi ≥ 1
6. 1 − (2xj − yj + ²) ≥ 1
2(a13 + a23)
9
> > > > =
> > > > ;
i,j = 1,2 i 6= j
• Drawing lots versus D3
3:
With drawing lots, Player 3 cannot gain more than π3 = 1
2(a13 +a23)−²0 ≤
π3(D3
3(ii)) because of constraint (6.).











0.00 0.5 + ² 0.5 − ²
1
A

















3 being the best proposal for Player 3:
33(i)
1. y1 + y2 ≤ x
2. 2y1 < x1
3. 2y2 < x2
4. 2xi − yi < 1
5. 1 − (2xi − yi + ²) < 1
2(a13 + a23)
6. 1 − (2xj − yj + ²) < 1
2(a13 + a23)
)
i,j = 1,2 i 6= j
7. 1 − (2xj − yj) ≤ 1 − (2xi − yi)
• Since all other kinds of proposal are excluded, DL²
3 is the best proposal.
• Simplex minimization for Player 3:
πmin
3 (DT²








0.7 + ² 0.0 0.3 − ²
1
A
















1. y1 + y2 ≤ x
2. 2yi < xi
3. 2yj ≥ xj
4. 2xj − yj < 1
5. 2xi − yi ≥ 1
6. 1 − (2xj − yj + ²) < 1
2(a13 + a23)
9
> > > > =
> > > > ;
i,j = 1,2 i 6= j
• Since all other kinds of proposal are excluded, DL²
3 is the best proposal.
• Simplex minimization for Player 3:
πmin
3 (DT²
3 (ii)) ≥ 1







0.00 0.68 + ² 0.32 − ²
1
A




















3 ), we ﬁnd that
1. y1 + y2 ≤ x
2. 2y1 < x2
3. 2y2 < x2
4. 2x1 − y1 ≥ 1
5. 2x2 − y2 ≥ 1












Note that this is also submatrix a, excluded in Proposition 2.





























7.1.4 Proof of Corollary 2








=⇒ Player 3 must oﬀer Player i at least a3i = µi
and Player j at least a3j = xj + ² (i,j = 1,2 i 6= j) to prevent D2 from being a single-
proposal equilibrium with π3 = 0. =⇒ D3 = (1
4, 1
2 + ², 1
4 − ²) or D3 = (1
2 + ², 1
4, 1
4 − ²)
with the correlated equilibrium C23 is the best reaction for Player 3, resulting in the
payoﬀs π1 = π2 = 7
16 + ²
4 and π3 = 1
8 − ²
2 (given D1 and D2, this is also the worst
situation for Player 3).
7.2 Proof of Propositions 3, 4, and 5, and of Corollaries 3
and 4
We prove these propositions and corollaries by constructing D2 in such a way that we
satisfy diﬀerent constraint sets in the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2. But since we have
only shown Propositions 1 and 2 for representative matrices a, we sometimes have to
interchange indices in the constraint sets to adapt them for the following proofs.
357.2.1 Proof of Proposition 3
1. Suppose that D1 ∈ A =⇒ Player 2’s payoﬀ will be at least π2 > 3




, if he proposes D2 = (1
2, 1
2,0), D2 = (a12,a11 − ²,a13 + ²), or D2 =
(1
2 − ², 1
2 − ²,2²).
A1) Suppose D2 = (1
2, 1
2,0) and D3 = (0, 1
2, 1
2) is the best reaction for Player 3 and a






















D1 = (0.6 0.1 0.3)
D
A1
2 = (0.5 0.5 0.0)
D3 = (0.0 0.5 0.5)
(73)
This can be satisﬁed if constraint set (i) of D
x
3 holds. The feasible set SA1 is then
determined by22
1. 2a21 ≥ a11 =⇒ a11 ≤ 1
2. 2a12 < a22 =⇒ a12 < 1
4
3. µ1 > x =⇒ a11 > 1
2
4. µ2 + 2y1 − x1 ≥ x =⇒ a12 ≥ 2a11 − 3
2
























































D1 = (0.55 0.4 0.05)
D
A2
2 = (0.50 0.5 0.00)
D3 = (0.00 0.5 0.50)
(76)
This requires
1. 2a21 ≥ a11 =⇒ a11 ≤ 1
2. 2a12 ≥ a22 =⇒ a12 ≥ 1
4
3. µ2 + 2a21 − a11 ≥ x =⇒ a12 ≥ 2a11 − 3
2
4. µ1 + 2a12 − a22 ≥ x =⇒ a12 ≥ 3
8 − 1
4a11
5. a11 > x =⇒ a11 ≥ 1
2
22The bold numbers will denote those constraints which are binding.





















A3) Suppose D2 = (a12,a11 − ²,a13 + ²) and D3 = (0,µ2,1 − µ2) is a single-proposal





a12 a11 − ² a13 + ²










D1 = (0.90 0.05 0.05)
D
A3
2 = (0.05 0.9 − ² 0.05 + ²)
D3 = (0.00 0.45 − ²
2 0.55 + ²
2)
This can be satisﬁed if the constraint set of D
µ
3 holds (note that µ2 = µ). The
feasible set SA3 is then determined by
1. 2a21 < a11 =⇒ a11 > 3
4
2. a23 ≥ a13 =⇒ ² > 0
3. 1 − µ2 + a13 > 2a23 =⇒ a12 ≥ ²0 − a11
4. µ2 > 3
8 =⇒ a12 > 3
4 − a11





















2 −²,2²) (² < 1
2 −a12) and D3 = (0, 1
2 −², 1
2 +²) is the best reaction






















37D1 = (0.5 0.4 0.1)
D
A4
2 = (0.5 − ² 0.5 − ² 2²)
D3 = (0.00 0.5 − ² 0.5 + ²)
Taking a11 = 1
2, a21 = a22 = 1
2 − ², we see that either of the constraints on A1 or





















2. Suppose D1 ∈ B =⇒ Player 2’s payoﬀ will be at least π2 > 3










2 −5²), D2 = (a12+²,1−(a12+²),0),
D2 = (a12 + 1
4 − 2², 3
4 − a12 + 2²,0), D2 = (5
8 + 4², 3
8 − 4²,0),
D2 = (a12 + 4²,1 − (a12 + 4²),0) or D2 = (1,0,0).
B1) Suppose D2 = (a12 + ²,1 − (a12 + ²),0) and D3 = (0,a12,1 − a12) is the best






a12 + ² 1 − (a12 + ²) 0










D1 = (0.1 0.55 0.35)
D
B1
2 = (0.55 + ² 0.45 − ² 0)
D3 = (0.00 0.55 0.45)
This can be satisﬁed if the constraint set (ii) of D
x
3 holds (by construction we
have x = a12). The feasible set SB1 is then determined by
1. 2a22 ≥ a12 =⇒ a12 < 2
3
2. 2a11 < a21 =⇒ a12 ≥ 2a11
3. µ2 < x =⇒ a12 ≥ 1
2




5. a23 < a13 =⇒ a12 < 1 − a11
6. 1 − µ2 + a23 ≤ 2a13 =⇒ a12 < 3
4 − a11
7. 1
2(1 − µ2 + a13) ≤ 1 − x =⇒ a12 < 1
2 + a11

























38(See Figure 2 )







B2) Suppose D2 = (3
4−a11+3², 3
4−a12+2²,a11+a12− 1
2−5²) and D3 = (0,µ2,1−µ2) is
the best reaction for Player 3 and a single-proposal equilibrium =⇒ This requires






4 − a11 + 3² 3
4 − a12 + 2² 1 − a21 − a22











D1 = (0.2 0.55 0.25)
D
B2
2 = (0.55 + 3² 0.2 + 2² 0)
D3 = (0.00 0.375 + ² 0.625 − ²)
This can be satisﬁed if the constraints of D
µ
3 hold. The feasible set SB2 is then
determined by
1. µ2 < µ1 =⇒ ² > 0
2. 2a11 < a21 =⇒ a11 ≤ 1
4
3. a23 ≤ a13 =⇒ a12 ≤ 3
4 − a11
4. 1 − µ2 + a23 > 2a13 =⇒ a12 > 5
8 − a11

































B3) Suppose D2 = (a12 + ²,1 − (a12 + ²),0) and D3 = (0,a12,1 − a12) is the best






a12 + ² 1 − (a12 + ²) 0










D1 = (0.35 0.55 0.10)
D
B2
2 = (0.55 + ² 0.45 − ² 0.00)
D3 = (0.00 0.55 0.45)
39This can be satisﬁed if the constraint set (iv) of D
x
3 holds. The feasible set SB3
is then determined by
1. 2a22 ≥ a12 =⇒ a12 < 2
3
2. 2a11 ≥ a21 =⇒ a12 < 2a11
3. µ1 + 2a22 − a12 ≥ a12 =⇒ a12 < 1
7a11 + 4
7
4. µ2 + 2a11 − a21 ≥ a12 =⇒ a12 < 1
4 + a11

































B4) Suppose D2 = (a12 − 1
4 − 2², 3
4 − a12 + 2²,0) and D3 = (0,µ2,1 − µ2) is the
best reaction for Player 3 and a single-proposal equilibrium =⇒ This requires






4 − 2² 3
4 − a12 + 2² 0










D1 = (0.2 0.7 0.1)
D
B2
2 = (0.95 − 2² 0.05 − 2² 0.0)
D3 = (0.00 0.375 + ² 0.625 − ²)
This can be satisﬁed if the constraints of D
µ
3 hold (a22 has to be non-negative).
The feasible set SB4 is then determined by
1. µ2 < µ1 =⇒ a12 > 1
2 − a11
2. 2a11 < a21 =⇒ a12 > 2a11 − 1
4
3. a23 ≤ a13 =⇒ a12 ≤ 1 − a11
4. 1 − µ2 + a23 > 2a13 =⇒ a12 > 11
16 − a11
5. a22 ≥ 0 =⇒ a12 ≤ 3
4






















































40B5) Suppose D2 = (5
8 + 4², 3
8 − 4²,0) and D3 = (0,µ2,1 − µ2) is the best reaction







8 + 4² 3
8 − 4² 0










D1 = (0.05 0.61 0.34)
D
B2
2 = (0.625 − 4² 0.375 − 4² 0.0)
D3 = (0.00 0.4925 − 2² 0.5075 + 2²)
This can be satisﬁed if the constraint set (ii) of Dcor
3 holds (a12 = x). The feasible
set SB5 is then determined by the following and the payoﬀ is greater than 3
8
1. 2a22 ≥ a12 =⇒ a12 < 3
4
2. 2a11 < a21 =⇒ a11 ≤ 5
16
3. µ1 + 2a22 − a12 ≤ a12 =⇒ a12 ≥ 17
32 + 1
4a11
4. µ1 + 2a22 − a12 ≤ µ2 =⇒ a12 ≥ 7
12 + 1
3a11
5. a23 ≤ a13 =⇒ a12 ≤ 1 − a11




2(1 − µ2 + a13) ≤ 1 − a12 =⇒ a12 ≥ 3
8 + 2a11




3(1 − (2a22 − a12) + a23 + a13) < 1
2(1 − µ2 + a13) =⇒ a12 < 47
72 − 2
9a11
10. a12 < a21 =⇒ a12 ≤ 5
8






















B6) Suppose D2 = (a12 + 4²,1 − (a12 + 4²),0) and D3 = (0,µ2,1 − µ2) is the best
reaction for Player 3 and implies the correlated equilibrium C13 =⇒ This requires





a12 + 4² 1 − (a12 + 4²) 0










D1 = (0.01 0.52 0.47)
D
B2
2 = (0.52 + 4² 0.48 − 4² 0.0)
D3 = (0.00 0.5 − 2² 0.5 + 2²)
41This can be satisﬁed if the constraint set (i) of Dcor
3 holds (by construction we
have x = a12). The feasible set SB6 is then determined by
1. 2a22 ≥ a12 =⇒ a12 < 2
3
2. 2a11 < a21 =⇒ a12 ≥ 2a11
3. µ2 < x =⇒ a12 ≥ 1
2




5. a23 < a13 =⇒ a12 < 1 − a11
6. 1 − µ2 + a23 ≤ 2a13 =⇒ a12 < 3
4 − a11
7. 1
2(1 − µ2 + a13) > 1 − x =⇒ a12 > 1
2 + a11






















B7) Suppose D2 = (1,0,0) and D3 = (0,µ2,1 − µ2) is the best reaction ﬁr Player 3
















D1 = (0.01 0.86 0.03)
D
B2
2 = (1.00 0.00 0.00)
D3 = (0.00 0.43 0.57)
This can be satisﬁed if the constraints of D
µ
3 hold. The feasible set SB7 is then
determined by
1. µ2 < µ1 =⇒ a12 < 1 + a11
2. 2a11 < a21 =⇒ a11 < 1
2
3. a23 ≤ a13 =⇒ a12 ≤ 1 − a11
4. 1 − µ2 + a23 > 2a13 =⇒ a12 > 2
3 − 4
3a11
5. µ2 > 3
8 =⇒ a12 > 3
4




















42Thus we have shown that ∀ D1 ∈ A ∪ B ∃ a proposal Ds
2 of Player 2, such that ρ is
symmetric and π2 > 3
8.
7.2.2 Proof of Corollary 3
1. Suppose D1 ∈ A1 ∪ A2 ∪ B1 ∪ B3 ∪ B5 and D2 is such that ρ is non-symmetric
and the best reaction for Player 2, then π2 ≥ 1
2, because if D2 is such that ρ is
symmetric Player 2 obtains at least π2 = 1
2 (see proof of Proposition 3). Further,
we have π3 > 1
4 from the proof of Proposition 2. Together with the resource
constraint we obtain 1 = π1 + π2 + π3 > 1
4 + 1
2 + 1
4 = 1 ¢ ¢ ¡ ¡ ¢ ¢ ®
2. Suppose D1 ∈ (A ∪ B)\{A1 ∪ A2 ∪ B1 ∪ B3 ∪ B5} and D2 is such that ρ is non-
symmetric and π1 ≥ 1
4.
First note that π1 ≥ 1
4 is only possible if the constraints for Do
3 or DL²
3 hold,
because otherwise Proposition 2 implies π1 = 0 and π2 ≥ 3
8, since the minimum
payoﬀ with D2 such that ρ is symmetric is π2 = 3
8.
(a) Suppose D2 is such that the constraints of Do





=⇒ a21 + a22 ≤ x and a21 = π1 ≥ 1
4, a22 = π2 ≥ 3
8 =⇒ 5
8 ≤ x ≤ 1
2 ¢ ¢ ¡ ¡ ¢ ¢ ®
(b) Suppose D2 is such that the constraints of DL²





and D3 = (0,2a12−a22+²,1−(2a12−a22+²)) is the best reaction for Player
3 and π1 = 1
3(a11 + a21) with π2 = 1
3(2a12 − a22 + ² + a12 + a22) = a12 + ²
3.





8 (² < 3
8) ¢ ¢ ¡ ¡ ¢ ¢ ®
ii. Suppose D2 ∈ A4 =⇒ π1 = 1
6 ¢ ¢ ¡ ¡ ¢ ¢ ®
iii. Suppose D2 ∈ B\(B1∪B3∪B5) =⇒ a11 ≤ 3
8 and 2a21 < a11 (constraints
of DL²




16 ¢ ¢ ¡ ¡ ¢ ¢ ®
(c) Suppose D2 is such that the constraints of DL²





and D3 = (2a11 − a21 + ²,0,1 − (2a11 − a21 + ²)) with π2 = 1
3(a12 + a22)
i. Suppose D2 ∈ A\(A1 ∪ A2 ∪ A4) =⇒ a12 ≤ 1
6 and π2 ≤ 1
9
since a22 ≤ a12. ¢ ¢ ¡ ¡ ¢ ¢ ®
ii. Suppose D2 ∈ A4 =⇒ π2 ≤ 1
3 < π2(A4) = 1
2 − ² ¢ ¢ ¡ ¡ ¢ ¢ ®
43iii. Suppose D2 ∈ B\(B1 ∪ B3 ∪ B5) =⇒ a12 ≤ 3
4 and π2 < 3
8
since 2a22 < a12.
7.2.3 Proof of Proposition 4 and Corollary 4
Suppose D1 ∈ C
C1) a11 + a12 ≤ 1
2 and D2 = (1 − a22,a22,0) with 1 − (2a22 − a12 + ²) = 1
2(1 − a11 −
a12) =⇒ a22 = 1
4(1+3a12+a11−2²) and D3 = (0,2a22−a12+²0,1−(2a22−a12+²0))
is the best reaction for Player 3 and a single-proposal equilibrium. This requires





1 − a22 a22 0











D1 = (0.10 0.10 0.8)
D
C1
2 = (0.65 + ²
2 0.35 − ²
2 0.0
D3 = (0.00 0.6 + ² + ²0 0.4 − (² + ²0))
This can be satisﬁed if the constraint set (i) of D3
3 hold with a22 = x. The feasible
set SC1 is then determined by
1. a11 + a12 ≤ a22 =⇒ a12 < 1 − 3a11
2. 2a11 < a21 =⇒ a12 ≤ 1 − 3a11
3. 2a12 < a22 =⇒ a12 < 1
5 + 1
5a11
4. 2a22 − a12 < 1 =⇒ a12 ≤ 1 − a11
5. 1 − (2a22 − a12 + ²0) > 1
2(a13 + a23) =⇒ ²0 < ²
6. a22 ≤ a21 =⇒ a12 ≤ 1
3 − 1
3a11
7. 2a21 − a11 > 2a22 − a12 =⇒ a12 ≤ 1
2 − a11





























44C2) D2 = (1−a22,a22,0) with 2a21−a11 = 1 =⇒ a21 = 1
2(1+a11) and a22 = 1
2(1−a11).
D3 = (0,2a22 − a12 + ²,1 − (2a22 − a12 + ²)) is the best reaction for Player 3 and





1 − a22 a22 0











D1 = (0.08 0.30 0.62)
D
C2
2 = (0.54 0.46 0.00
D3 = (0.00 0.62 + ² 0.38 − ²)
This can be satisﬁed if the constraint set (ii) of D3
3 holds with a22 = x. The
feasible set SC2 is then determined by
1. a11 + a12 ≤ a22 =⇒ a12 ≤ 1
2 − 3
2a11
2. 2a11 < a21 =⇒ a11 < 1
3
3. 2a12 ≥ a22 =⇒ a12 ≥ 1
4 − 1
4a11
4. 2a22 − a12 < 1 =⇒ a12 > −a11
5. 2a21 − a11 ≥ 1 =⇒ 1 ≥ 1
6. 1 − (2a22 − a12 + ²) ≥ 1
2(a13 + a23) =⇒ a12 > 1
3 − a11
7. a22 ≤ a21 =⇒ a11 ≥ 0
8. 2a22 − a12 ≥ 1
2 =⇒ a12 ≤ 1
2 − a11




































C3) D2 = (1 − a22,a22,0) with 2a22 − a12 = 1
2 =⇒ a21 = 1
4(3 − 2a12) and a22 =
1
4(1 + 2a12). D3 = (0,2a22 − a12 + ²,1 − (2a22 − a12 + ²)) is the best reaction






1 − a22 a22 0
0 1











D1 = (0.02 0.24 0.74)
D
C3
2 = (0.63 0.37 0.0
D3 = (0.00 0.5 + ² 0.5 − ²)
45This can be satisﬁed if the constraint set (ii) of D3
3 holds with a22 = x. The
feasible set SC3 is then determined by
1. a11 + a12 ≤ a22 =⇒ a12 ≤ 1
2 − 2a11
2. 2a11 < a21 =⇒ a12 < 3
2 − 4a11
3. 2a12 ≥ a22 =⇒ a12 ≥ 1
6
4. 2a22 − a12 < 1 =⇒ 1
2 < 1
5. 2a21 − a11 ≥ 1 =⇒ a12 ≤ 1
2 − a11
6. 1 − (2a22 − a12 + ²) ≥ 1
2(a13 + a23) =⇒ a12 > −a11
7. a22 ≤ a21 =⇒ a12 ≤ 1
2





















C4) D2 = (1−a22,a22,0) with 2a22−a12+² = 2a21−a11 =⇒ a21 = 1
4(2+a11−a21+²)
and a21 = 1
4(2 − a11 + a21 − ²). D3 = (0,2a22 − a12 + ²0,1 − (2a22 − a12 + ²0))






1 − a22 a22 0











D1 = (0.06 0.10 0.84)
D
C4
2 = (0.49 + ² 0.51 − ² 0.0
D3 = (0.00 0.92 − ²
2 + ²0 0.08 + ²
2 − ²0)
This can be satisﬁed if the constraint set (i) of D
T²
3 holds with a21 = x. The
feasible set SC4 is then determined by
1. a11 + a12 ≤ a21 =⇒ a12 ≤ 2
5 − 3
5a11
2. 2a11 < a21 =⇒ a12 ≤ 2 − 7a11
3. 2a12 < a22 =⇒ a12 < 2
7 − 1
7a11
4. 2a22 − a12 < 1 =⇒ a12 ≥ −a11
5. 1 − (2a22 − a12 + ²0) < 1
2(a13 + a23) =⇒ a12 < 1
2 − a11
6. a21 ≤ a22 =⇒ a12 > a11
7. 2a21 − a11 > 2a22 − a12 =⇒ ² > 0



























(see Figure 3), we show that, given
(a11,a12) ∈ SC5 the share of Player 1 is π1 = 0 if Player 2’s best proposal implies ρ
to be non-symmetric or the share of Player 2 is π2 > 3
8 if Player 2’s best proposal
implies ρ to be symmetric.




(a11,a12)|a11 + a12 > 1
2 , a11 < 1






(a11,a12)|a11 + a12 ≤ 1
2 , a12 ≥ 2
7 − 1







(a11,a12)|a11 + a12 ≤ 1
2 , a12 ≥ 1 − 3a11 , a11 ≥ 0
ª (118)
(a) Given (a11,a12) ∈ S1
C5 =⇒ with D2 = (1
2 +², 1
2 −²,0), the inequalities of D
x²
3
hold and D3 = (0, 1
2 −²+²0, 1
2 +²−²0) is the best proposal for Player 3 with
D3 being a proposal equilibrium including π1 = 0 and π2 = 1
2 − ² + ²0.
i. Suppose Player 2 constructs his proposal D2 in such a way that ρ is
non-symmetric and π1 > 0, then the inequalities of DL²
3 or Do
3 must
hold (a11 = y1, a12 = y2). But y1 + y2 ≤ x cannot hold since x ≤ 1
2.
ii. Suppose Player 2 constructs his proposal D2 in such a way that ρ is
symmetric and π2 ≤ 3
8, then this cannot be his best proposal as propos-
ing D2 = (1
2 + ², 1
2 − ²,0) with non-symmetric ρ and ² < 1
8 ensures him
a share of π2 > 3
8.
(b) Given (a11,a12) ∈ S2
C5∪S3
C5 =⇒ with D2 = (1−(a11+a12−²),a11+a12−²,0)
the inequalities of D
x²
3 hold and D3 = (0,a11 + a12 − ² + ²0,1 − (a11 + a12 −
²+²0) is the best proposal for Player 3 with D3 being a proposal equilibrium
including π1 = 0 and π2 = a12 + a11 − ² + ²0.
i. Suppose Player 2 constructs his proposal D2 in such a way that ρ is non-
symmetric, π1 > 0, and the inequalities of Do
3 hold, with π2 = a12. This
cannot be the best reaction for Player 2 as D2 = (1−(a11+a12−²),a11+
a12−²,0) with ² < a11 ensures him a share of π2 = a11+a12−²+²0 > a12.
ii. Suppose Player 2 constructs his proposal D2 in such a way that ρ is
non-symmetric, π1 > 0 and the inequalities of DL²
3 hold with D3 =
(2a21−a11+²,0,1−(2a21−a22+²)) is the best proposal for Player 3 (a11 =
y1 , a12 = y2) =⇒ This cannot be the best reaction for Player 2 because
his share π2 = 1
3(x2 + y2) must exceed his share π2 = y1 + y2 + ² − ²0
generated by D2 = (0, 1
2 − ² + ²0, 1
2 + ² − ²0). But
1




=⇒ x2 = 1
x1≤1−x2 =⇒ x1 = 0 = x ¢ ¢ ¡ ¡ ¢ ¢ ®
(119)
since a12 ≥ 1
4 and a11 + a12 ≤ x
47iii. Suppose Player 2 constructs his proposal D2 in such a way that ρ is
symmetric and π2 ≤ 3
8 =⇒
• a11 + a12 ≤ 3
8 and
• D3 ∈ {Dcor
3 ,DL
3} must hold.
Otherwise Player 2 can obtain a share of π2 = a11 + a12 − ² + ²0 >
3
8 ≥ a11 > a12 by choosing ² < a11 + a12 − 3
8 and proposing D2 =
(1−(a11+a12−²),a11+a12−²,0) with non-symmetric ρ. This also implies
D3 ∈ {Dcor
3 ,DL












8−a11]} and given symmetric ρ, we have x ≤ a11 ≤ 3
8 ∨ x ≤ a12 ≤ 1
16.
α. Suppose Player 2 constructs his proposal D2 in such a way that ρ is
symmetric and D3 = Dcor
3 is the best proposal for Player 3 leading
to a correlated equilibrium C23 =⇒
This cannot be the best reaction for Player 2 because his share
π2(Dcor
3 ) = 1
2(µ2 + x2) = 1
2(1





3 ) = a11 + a12 − ² + ²0, which implies
3
4a22 + 1
























8 =⇒ a22 ≤ 3
8
(122)
β. Suppose Player 2 constructs his proposal D2 in such a way that ρ is
symmetric and D3 = Dcor
3 is the best proposal for Player 3 leading
to a correlated equilibrium C13 =⇒
This cannot be the best reaction for Player 2 since his share is given
by π2 = 1
2(a12 + a32) ≤ a12 because Φ(a32) ≤ 2.
γ. Suppose Player 2 constructs his proposal D2 in such a way that ρ
is symmetric and D3 = DL
3 is the best proposal for Player 3 leading
to a selection of the proposal by drawing lots =⇒
This cannot be the best reaction for Player 2 because if a32 = 2a12−
a22 + ² we have π2(DL
3) = 1




and if a32 = 0, π2(DL
3) > π2(D
x²
3 ) would imply
1





=⇒ a22 ≥ 1
(123)
48But then we have a23 = 0, a13 ≥ 5
8, and a33 ≤ 1, which cannot lead
to a decision by drawing lots with Φ(a33) = 3.
iv. Suppose (a11,a12) ∈ S2
C5 and Player 2 constructs his proposal D2 in such
a way that ρ is non-symmetric, π1 > 0, and the inequalities of DL²
3 (i)
hold with D3 = (0,2a22−a12+²,1−(2a22−a12+²)) is the best proposal
for Player 3 (a11 = y1 , a12 = y2) =⇒
3y2
2y2<x2
< 2x2 − y2
2x2−y2<2x1−y1
< 2x1 − y1
x1≤1−x2
≤ 2(1 − x2) − y1
2y2<x2







y1 ¢ ¢ ¡ ¡ ¢ ¢ ®
(124)
since a12 ≥ 2
7 − 1
7a11 must hold in S2
C5.
v. Suppose (a11,a12) ∈ S2
C5 and Player 2 constructs his proposal D2 in such
a way that ρ is non-symmetric, π1 > 0, and the inequalities of DL²
3 (ii)
hold with D3 = (0,2a22−a12+²,1−(2a22−a12+²)) is the best proposal
for Player 3 (a11 = y1 , a12 = y2) =⇒
1 ≤ 2x1 − y1
x1≤1−x2
≤ 2 − 2x2 − y1
x2≥x
≤ 2 − 2x − y1
y1+y2≤x







y1 ¢ ¢ ¡ ¡ ¢ ¢ ®
(125)
since a12 ≤ 1
2 − 3
2a11 must hold in S2
C5.
vi. Suppose (a11,a12) ∈ S3
C5 and Player 2 constructs his proposal D2 in such
a way that ρ is non-symmetric, π1 > 0, and the inequalities of DL²
3 hold
with D3 = (0,2a22 − a12 + ²,1 − (2a22 − a12 + ²)) is the best proposal
for Player 3 (a11 = y1 , a12 = y2) =⇒




≤ 1 − x1
2y1<x1
< 1 − 2y1
=⇒ y2 < 1 − 3y1 ¢ ¢ ¡ ¡ ¢ ¢ ®
(126)
since a12 ≥ 1 − 3a11 must hold in S3
C5.
Thus we have proved Proposition 4 and Corollary 4.
7.2.4 Proof of Proposition 5






=⇒ π2 = 1
4 is already shown in Corollary 1.





=⇒ D3 = (²,0,1 − ²) is the best reaction for Player 3
with D3 being a single-proposal equilibrium =⇒ π2 = 0
49The solution set is given by
S1 = {[0,0] × [0,1]} (127)
(See Figure 4)






1. a22 < 1
2




then the constraints of D
µ
3 hold and D
µ
3 = (µ1,0,1 − µ1) is the best reaction for
Player 3 with D
µ
3 being a single-proposal equilibrium. =⇒ π2 = 0




























× [0,1 − a21]
ª (129)
(See Figure 4)






1. a22 < 1
2




2(1 − µ1 + a23) ≤ 1 − a21 =⇒ a22 ≥ 1
2a21
(130)
then the constraints (ii) of D
x
3 hold and D
x
3 = (x,0,1−x) is the best reaction for
Player 3 with D
x
3 being a single-proposal equilibrium. =⇒ π2 = 0

























2(1 − µ1 + a23) > 1 − a21 =⇒ a22 < 1
2a21
(132)
then the constraints (a) of Dcor
3 hold and Dcor
3 = (µ1,0,1−µ1) is the best reaction
for Player 3 with C23 being a correlated equilibrium. =⇒ π2 = 1
2a22 < 1
10































1. a22 ≥ 1
2
2. µ1 + 2a22 − 1 < a21 =⇒ a22 < 1
2 + 1
4a21
3. 1 − µ1 − (2a22 − 1) > 2a23 =⇒ a21 > 0
(134)
then the constraints (i) of D
µi
3 hold and D
µi
3 = (µ1,2a22−1+²,1−(µ1+2a22−1+²))
is the best reaction for Player 3 with D
µi
3 being a single-proposal equilibrium. =⇒
π2 = 2a22 − 1 + ² < 1
5 + ²
































1. a21 > 0




then the constraints (i) of D
x
3 hold and D
x
3 = (x,0,1−x) is the best reaction for
Player 3 with D
x
3 being a single proposal equilibrium. =⇒ π2 = 0














Altogether we have shown that D2 = (1,0,0) is the best reaction for Player 2 given
D1 = (0,1,0)
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Figure 4: Feasible set S.
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